From Midshipman to China Expert: An Interview with Maggie Jackson

Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics  >  Trustee China Hand

Maggie Jackson is a non-resident expert with the Trustee Chair. In this interview, conducted earlier this month, we ask her about how she became interested in China, her experience in government, and her view of trends in climate policy and clean tech. 

1. How did your experience in the US Navy shape the way you approach your current work, and what unique perspective has it given you when thinking about issues in your portfolio today? 

I went to China for the first time as a midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy on a study abroad trip. I spent five months studying in Beijing and traveling around the country. It was 2008—the year China made its grand entrance back onto the world stage by hosting the Olympics. I was fascinated by Chinese language and culture, and the fact that, until that point, my education had largely focused only on Western civilization. The U.S. Navy was eager at that time to encourage students to study critical languages, including Mandarin. Following graduation, I signed up to return to Asia and went to Japan for my first duty station. I spent four years deployed to the Indo-Pacific region, sailing the waters in the South China Sea during a time when it wasn’t headline news. I was amazed that no one in my social and academic circles seemed to be thinking much about China, especially in the midst of the “global war on terror.” Of course, that was all rapidly changing.  

After I got out of the Navy, I had the opportunity to do a Fulbright in China (a program that is critically important and should be reinstated). By then, I had spent considerable time in China and across Asia and was eager to make sense of how middle- and lower-income countries could continue on an economic development path in the face of an emerging climate crisis. I studied how China came to dominate production and deployment of solar power, and I analyzed what that impact meant for the United States and the rest of the world. My Navy background exposed me to how China operated around Asia, not just in terms of warships at sea, but investment and economic relationships across the region. It gave me the perspective to understand that the United States could not rely on military power alone to gain favor in the eyes of other countries and provide regional stability. As they pursued the path to economic development, they needed more than just open sea lanes and military posturing, and often it was China showing up, especially in terms of infrastructure and energy development.  

My experience that ranges from service on a U.S. warship to studies in a leading Chinese university helps me view the U.S.-China relationship from multiple angles, and understand how U.S. policymakers think, depending on where they sit. It underscores to me the importance of bringing together diverse stakeholders to develop policy decisions that can take into account opportunities and risks and, ultimately, decide where to prioritize. The United States doesn’t have a clear policy towards China and, lately, it’s even more full of contradictions. Yet China, beyond being a “pacing threat” and “strategic competitor” is also the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, and, without China, the world cannot combat increasingly severe impacts of climate change. So we have to figure out a way forward because, in the end, climate change will be indiscriminate about its impacts and will heighten the tensions and inequalities that already exist around the world. 

2. What is something that is often overlooked in China policy or research? 

China is an incredibly complicated place, home to futuristic cities with dynamic technological advancements and rural, poor villages where people are struggling to maintain a livelihood. I’ve witnessed people come to China for the first time be blown away, not by the modern buildings and technology, but the fact that many people living in the center of Beijing hutongs still must use a public restroom. The view of China’s progress from the United States shifts by the day, and contradictions within its development and growth model mean that many things can be true at the same time. China can have crippling demographic and economic challenges while still competing with the United States and the world on the most advanced technologies. I have the most respect for experts in China studies who make very well-educated guesses about what’s going on in China in their fields, while acknowledging how much they don’t know. 

3. You worked at the Department of Commerce during the Biden administration.  What did the Biden administration get wrong about China (regarding industrial policy, commercial engagement, etc.)? What did it get right?   

To set the stage, I think we often underestimate the impact of COVID-19 on U.S.-China relations. I occasionally wonder what the U.S.-China relationship would look like if COVID hadn’t happened. The urgency of reducing supply chain dependencies probably wouldn’t be here in the same way but a trend towards greater mistrust and derisking on both sides would have continued to happen, nonetheless. One of the biggest impacts was the lack of people-to-people engagement for many years that had negative repercussions on interpersonal relationships across the two countries, especially at the highest levels of government, culminating in the infamous balloon incident.  

In the end, the Biden administration made a positive turnaround in seeking engagement with China across many departments to set a new floor for the relationship and make progress, even if modest, in areas like commercial diplomacy and climate commitments. At the same time, the administration ramped up economic pressure on China through various tools, including export controls, entity listings, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and Section 301 tariffs. However, using chokepoint technologies as an economic weapon to hold back China often failed to stem its technological advancements. We saw Huawei roll out a new smartphone powered by a Chinese-made advanced semiconductor and DeepSeek announce its AI model with less compute than thought possible. These economic actions further drove our two countries on a path towards zero-sum competition path with no clear off-ramp in sight but, at each step, officials worked to improve clarity and communication with Beijing, while avoiding unnecessary escalation and misunderstanding.  

Despite the considerable political constraints that the Biden administration faced around engagement with China, it succeeded in charting a path forward based on a model of competing where we needed to and cooperating where we could. Further, through investments under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, CHIPS and Science Act, and Inflation Reduction Act, the administration made significant investments in revamping the U.S. industrial base and innovation ecosystem to bolster U.S. technological leadership, while at the same time, deepening relationships with allies and partners around the world to diversify supply chains and address shared challenges, such as artificial intelligence and climate change, which was significant in terms of matching the scale of China’s influence.  

4. Looking ahead, what opportunities and constraints do you see for the Trump administration as it approaches climate policy and economic competition with China? 

President Trump views himself as unconstrained in foreign policy and his approach towards China is a distinct shift away from the hawkish posture his administration adopted in his first term. He has openly spoken about inviting in Chinese investment as a part of his efforts to strengthen U.S. domestic manufacturing. This approach could provide a window of opportunity to work with China to improve commercial relations and create a more level playing field for U.S. companies to compete in China and around the world, including in areas such as clean tech. Despite the challenges associated with China’s dominance in clean tech manufacturing, the result is affordable solutions for countries working to achieve both economic development and climate goals simultaneously. For many U.S. companies to provide the most advanced technologies at an affordable price in the future, they need the policy space to partner with Chinese companies to catch up in some technologies, like solar, batteries, and electric vehicles.   

Though Trump doesn’t feel constrained by historical precedent in policy, he certainly does by China’s manufacturing prowess and what it means for U.S. national security. China’s control of rare earth elements and willingness to limit exports inflicted enough economic pain that Trump backed down on his further escalation of tariff threats in 2025. His administration is making some efforts to diversify supply away from China, including by spurring mining investment in the United States and creating partnerships with other countries, such as the FORGE initiative. However, he is putting up his own constraints on the ability of the United States to address economic issues through actions, such as rolling back EV incentives that were a catalyst for domestic battery manufacturing, cancelling clean energy projects that would help support rising U.S. electricity demand, and cutting funds for science and research that underpin the U.S. leadership in innovation. The United States should engage with China to set ground rules and allow both countries to thrive economically, but it must do so from a position of strength, which we can only achieve if we reverse current detrimental policies and, instead, fund education and research, support immigrants who contribute to our scientific breakthroughs, and rapidly deploy advanced technologies that underpin a clean energy economy.  

6. Clean technologies are very much a part of U.S.-China economic competition. Given China’s dominance in sectors like solar, EVs, and critical mineral refining, how should the United States balance the benefits of Chinese investment and supply with the risks to domestic innovation and national security? 

The United States is not alone in dealing with the tension between overreliance on Chinese clean tech and economic and national security risks. The world is grappling with how to respond to the scale of Chinese manufacturing, increasingly in advanced technology areas, and concerns over domestic industry, surveillance, and economic coercion. China has made a significant contribution to the clean energy transition across the world, including the fact that it has driven the cost of renewable energy down by over 90% in sectors like solar panels and batteries, enabling countries to shift away from reliance on fossil fuels to drive economic development. The wars in Ukraine and Iran are placing energy security front and center in foreign policy and will result in further desire for resilient energy supplies, including from renewables, and perhaps even diversifying away from the United States and accepting more trade with China.  

The United States should pursue a policy that acknowledges where it makes sense to continue trade and investment ties with China, for example, in areas like solar and batteries to meet energy demand. We should have a policy that allows U.S. and Chinese companies to partner in a way that benefits the United States and results in high-standard infrastructure, employment and upskilling opportunities, and technology breakthroughs that help to solve shared challenges. Simultaneously, the U.S. must address the risks that internet-connected technologies pose to data and cybersecurity, including from China but also other nefarious actors. Beyond the relationship with China, we should be strengthening the U.S. domestic innovation ecosystem, supporting U.S. companies in their efforts to commercialize and scale new technologies, and working with allies to diversify supply chains. Energy underpins the economy, and as electricity demand rises, especially from AI datacenters, the United States needs to focus on deploying renewable energy and clean, firm power as quickly as possible, while developing and scaling new technologies that will meet the energy challenge in a century where climate risks will continue to pervade everyday life if greenhouse gas emissions go unchecked. National security requires that the United States rebuild an industrial base with a strong clean energy foundation to meet the demands of an increasingly connected world, while addressing climate change at the same time. 

7. Given the shifting relationship between the U.S. and China, what advice would you give to young professionals seeking a career in China policy?   

Making foreign policy starts with personal relationships. Build them. Learn the language—it’s a gateway to learning Chinese history and culture. If you have the opportunity to go to China in a way you feel comfortable, especially through a school or fellowship program, do it. And if you can’t get to China, seek out one of the many members of the Chinese diaspora in your school or in your community and get to know them. Most importantly, ground yourself in an understanding of what China is beyond the Communist Party of China and, at a minimum, gain a respect for the rich history and diverse culture that China represents. Only then, you can start to form ideas about policy for yourself. No answers will be easy, but you will be able to bring a more balanced perspective, informed by your own experience, in a field where our country will need expertise well into the future. 

Related Trustee Chair Activity

Michael Davidson and Sandy Qian, "China’s Solar Industry Is in Upheaval—The Effects Will Be Global", CSIS Brief, March 12, 2026.

Ilaria Mazzocco and Ryan Featherston, The Global EV Shift: The Role of China and Industrial Policy in Emerging Economies, CSIS Report, October 22, 2025.

Ilaria Mazzocco and Deborah Seligsohn, "Assessing China’s New Climate Commitments", CSIS Critical Questions, October 2, 2025.

Ilaria Mazzocco, "Analyzing the Impact of the U.S.-China Trade War on China’s Energy Transition", CSIS Critical Questions, April 22, 2025.

Ilaria Mazzocco, "Rethinking Competition with China on Clean Technologies", CSIS Commentary, October 24, 2024.